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Are there alternatives to Growth Pessimism? 
Reflections on how innovation strategies may contribute to sustainable development. 
Björn Johnson and Bengt-Åke Lundvall 
Introduction 
In this very tentative paper we address the relationship between economic growth and 
sustainable development from a specific perspective. We give full attention to the 
potential of a strategy that mobilizes knowledge, learning and innovation to approach 
‘sustainable  development’.   In   recent  contributions it has been pointed out that these 
same factors have been at the origin of the current unsustainability itself (Sanders 
2012, p.6). Inventions and innovations making possible more intensive and extensive 
use of both renewable and non-renewable natural resources have been prerequisites 
for population growth and for making the world economy as non-sustainable as it has 
become. 
But in spite of this observation, which we do accept, it is difficult to envisage any 
successful strategy for environmental survival that does not make full use of 
knowledge and innovation. We will not argue that a more knowledge-based and 
innovation-driven development, by itself, will take us in the right direction. But we 
will argue that with a directed effort toward resource economy the mobilization of 
knowledge and innovation is a prerequisite for success. Therefore the struggle is not 
for or against advancing knowledge and stimulating innovation but rather a struggle 
about giving new directions for innovation and learning. 
A  second  major  point  is  that  ‘institutions  matter’.  We  cannot  envisage  any  change  in  
the  direction  of  sustainability  without  ‘radical  institutional  change’.  We  will  discuss  a  
series   of  minor   reforms   and   policy   changes   including   ‘nudging’.   But  we   recognize 
that the required changes may need to go as far as challenging the current version of 
capitalism as well as the predominant governance system. The current system of 
global governance where nation states focus their policy efforts upon national growth 
and upon safeguarding the international competitiveness of domestic firms is not 
compatible with moving in the new directions. Neither is the current dominant status 
of a profit driven and privately controlled financial sector organized at the national 
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level but operating globally. In the new governance mode market mechanisms and 
competition must be used to reduce the need for detailed planning and regulation. But 
their functioning will need to become much more restricted by regulations. And 
increasingly such regulation must become agreed upon at the global level. 
Defining the problem 
When discussing whether long term economic growth should be restricted, or even 
stopped, because of its negative environmental impacts it is necessary to define what 
economic growth is. There is no single correct way either to define or to measure 
economic growth. There are certain conventions that have been agreed upon through 
the UN system and those conventions are not always sensible and meaningful, 
especially not if one wants a close correlation between economic growth and growth 
in welfare, well-being and living standards. But they are generally used and without 
accepting   some   set   of   conventions   we   can’t   even   state   the   problem.   So   in   what  
follows we will use a definition and assume a measurement method that corresponds 
to the conventions and measurement practices used at national statistical offices. We 
assume that total real production Y is measured as GNP in constant prices. So the 
question that we will ask is if it is possible to maintain a growth in GDP compatible 
with long term environmental sustainability. 
When we ask the question if long run growth in GDP is compatible with 
environmental sustainability it is of course necessary to have a reasonably clear 
conceptualization of what we mean by sustainability. Environmental sustainability is 
a multidimensional concept. It includes at least the following aspects:  
Pollution of water and air 
Resource exhaustion 
Global warming 
Loss  of  “carrying  capacity”  and  “resilience”  of  ecosystems 
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Loss of recreational and esthetical values connected to natural and cultural landscapes 
(amenities)1 
What is a tolerable development in these dimensions is not easy to define. It is a 
relative concept that is elastic and continuously changing over time.2 It also depends 
on our knowledge about how the environment reacts on different impacts from 
economic activities. One might consider to set the level on the basis of what our own 
generation  of  decision  makers  define  as  ‘tolerable’  – this corresponds to how Myrdal 
defines   dominating   values   (“the   modernization   ideals”)   in   the   ‘Asian   Drama’.  
Alternatively   it   might   be   set   by   assemblies   of   ‘enlightened’   citizens   who   have   got  
access to a reasonable amount of knowledge about risks and opportunities. 
We need to specify the time span of the analysis. Taking the very long view it may be 
argued that the laws of thermodynamics will bring the human existence on the planet 
to an end at some point whatever we do. This is not very helpful. We should, 
however, think at least a couple of generations ahead. Global warming is an example 
where radical action now is a prerequisite for avoiding sufferings already for the next 
couple of generations. How much weight we give to the interests of future generations 
will be reflected in the discount rates we use when discussing green investments. 
We also need to specify the unit of analysis in geographical space. Some of the 
sustainability issues such as desertification and deforestation will require local action. 
Cities are important units of analysis and potential collective actors. The strongest set 
of policy instruments and foras for debate are at the national level instruments and 
national action, including the readiness to give up national sovereignty, will in the 
short to medium term be decisive for developing new green strategies. But enhancing 
national performance may not lead to acceptable global outcomes. One country may 
reduce its footprints dramatically by getting rid of certain polluting activities in such a 
                                                 
1 The problem lies not only in these dimensions in their own respect. It becomes complicated by the 
interrelations between them. There are also discontinuities and irreversible changes in the set of future 
options. Examples are soil erosion, desertification, loss of groundwater reservoirs, and loss of 
biodiversity.  
2  There may be important differences across cultures that make global agreements on what is 
acceptable degrees of sustainability difficult to reach. In some cultures the original nature may be seen 
as something that should be protected. In other cultures the nature refined by man may be seen as more 
valuable and in yet others the technological control of nature is seen as natural.  
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way that they are just moved to another part of the world where the negative global 
impact becomes worse. The most obvious case is of course global warming.  
In what follows we focus upon growth and sustainability at the world scale but we see 
it as reflecting different national patterns of development. As we shall see the 
predominance of national governance and the competition among nation states is one 
of the most serious hindrances for making growth less unsustainable and for slowing 
down global warming   
On the complexity of growth   
It is important to take some of the basic characteristics of economic growth on board 
from  the  beginning.  The  following  five  more  or   less  interrelated  “stylized  facts”  are  
useful to keep the complex nature of the notion of economic growth in mind and 
avoid simplified views and conclusions. 
First, economic growth is a synthetic and aggregated measure of very different 
economic activities. Furthermore, the growth rate depends on a number of accounting 
conventions about what to include and exclude. For example, measures only include 
activities in the formal sector, which means that comparisons between countries at 
different levels of income are difficult and that the measures change with changes in 
the demarcation line between the formal and informal sector. 
Second, economic growth is always connected to structural change.  The empirical 
record is clear on this point. In economic growth the economy always expands in 
some sectors while other sectors stagnate (Kuznets 1971). Outside growth models 
there is no such thing as balanced growth where everything grows with the same rate. 
In the long run economic growth is always a process of technological, organizational 
and institutional transformation and, hence, of structural change. 
Third, economic growth is not a normal or natural condition. This is the classical 
economists’   view:   increase   is   natural   and   will   occur   wherever   opportunity   and  
scarcity exists. Remove the obstacle and growth will take care of itself.  As observed 
by  Landes  (1998):  “Growth  and development call for enterprise and enterprise is not 
to  be  taken  for  granted.”  Similarly,  discussing  the  dynamics  of  cities  Peter  Hall  (1998)  
observes   that   innovative   bursts   of   growth   are   rare   phenomena:   “What   makes   a  
particular city, at a particular time, suddenly become immensely creative, 
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exceptionally innovative? Why should this spirit flower for a few years, generally a 
decade   or   two   at   the   most,   and   then   disappear   as   suddenly   as   it   came?”   In   short:  
growth is not a basic, default state of the economy. It has to be understood and dealt 
with in its unique, specific, historic and context dependent forms.  
Fourth, economic growth is connected to institutions and institutional change. It has 
never been controversial to state that economic growth depends on technological 
change. It has been less obvious that institutions play an equally basic role in 
economic growth as technologies do. Classical economists (especially Karl Marx) 
realized this. Institutional economists like Veblen, Commons, Myrdal, Polanyi, etc. 
regarded it as decisive and, lately, institutions have again been elevated to a crucially 
important role. Such ideas about the supremacy of institutions may be too vague to be 
really useful but if we focus on the institutions that form the learning capabilities of 
individuals and organizations it is clear that a connection between institutions on one 
hand  and  growth  and  development  on  the  other  hand  may  be  regarded  as  a  ”stylized  
fact”.      Building   institutions   that   promote   ‘green   learning’   is   therefore   a major 
challenge. 
Fifth, economic growth is difficult, maybe impossible, to plan or control in a 
capitalist economy. The key instrument of competition in the capitalist economic 
process is new knowledge. As a consequence the economic process becomes a 
learning process - experimental, searching and groping. Such processes may be 
triggered  by  and  given  direction  by  political  decisions  but  outcomes  can’t  be  known  
and planned in advance. This is true also for political attempts to move the economy 
toward sustainability. The centrally planned economy may have a greater capacity to 
steer the direction of change but historical examples illustrate that it might be at the 
cost of learning and innovation. And so far their capacity to move growth toward 
sustainable trajectories have been all but impressive. 
What does it mean to slow down growth? 
It follows from the stylized facts above that there is no automatic causality from 
growth to the sustainability of the world. Seen from a purely technical perspective one 
can construct scenarios where technical and structural change take forms that reduce 
the ecological footprint over time while the economy keeps growing. To illustrate this 
point we will start by stating the problem in very simple terms. 
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Total production will reflect number of working hours and production per hour (Q). 
Number of working hours will reflect number of employed (L) and average number of 
working hours per employed (T). 
 
Y=L x T x Q     (1) 
 
Aggregate economic growth measured as percentage per annum (y) can thus (as 
approximation) be broken down in annual percentage growth in numbers of employed 
(l), growth in working hours per employed (t) and growth in output per working hour 
(q). 
 
y=l+t+q     (2) 
 
This disaggregation of aggregate growth is useful when it comes to the discussion of 
what it implies for respectively employment and working hours to reduce or nullify 
the rate of economic growth. It is useful also because it may help to capture very 
different types of changes adding to aggregate economic growth at the world level. 
While mature economies in the OECD area will be characterized by moderate trend 
change in the total labor force operating in the formal sector this may not be the case 
countries in Africa and in India where more than half the population are active in the 
unmeasured informal sector and where the proportion has been growing.  
Breaking down L, Y and Q in respectively formal and informal part may be necessary 
to capture the character of global growth and its impact upon sustainability. The 
mechanisms linking growth to environmental sustainability may be very different if 
we focus upon growth reflecting increases in labor productivity in a mature economy 
or if we focus upon the activities of informal sector workers or upon their integration 
into the formal sector. 
Reducing working hours (T) and reducing the supply of labor (N) by for instance 
being more generous to old people, to parents with small children and to handicapped 
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would reduce growth in the rich countries and it may be argued that it would be 
affordable for the population in these countries. But currently the opposite strategy is 
on the political agenda. The current emphasis on increasing the supply of labor in the 
North of Europe is motivated by the competitiveness of the national economy a 
problematic perspective that we shall come back to later.3  
A less attractive method to slow down growth would be to leave people who want to 
work, including the young generation, jobless. The fear of this kind of involuntary 
‘ecological  unemployment’  is  sometimes  exploited by sectoral capitalist organizations 
to organize opposition against taxes on specific polluting industries and sometimes 
with support from trade unions. In such situations it is important to point out that 
unemployed could be absorbed in green jobs, for instance by offering jobs in the 
recycling sectors. 
In the less developed countries a transfer of workers from the informal to the formal 
sector may be seen as prerequisite for long term social sustainability. Understanding 
how this kind of transfer can take place without worsening the ecological foot-print is 
a major challenge for research and for policy makers. It is important to note that 
informal sector activities may have significant negative impact upon the environment 
(deforestation and desertification). In such cases the impact of the transfer may go in 
different more or less green directions.    
Environmental impact. 
What is the induced impact on environment of economic growth? To make it simple 
we and for illustrative purposes we will focus upon one environmental dimension at 
the time – it could be the use of one specific non-renewable scarce resource or the 
emission CO2.4 For a given volume of production (Y) we assume a quantity of this 
resource (R) to be used. We can then define resource productivity as: 
Y/R=A     (3) 
                                                 
3 One of the most obvious paradoxes and failures of the European project that reflects the strength of 
the national perspective on public policy is that the focus of national economic policy in the North of 
Europe is now strongly on increasing the supply of domestic labor while the unemployment in the 
South of Europe has reached record levels. 
4 See footnote 1 for caveats. 
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We define the growth in R as r, the growth in Y as y and the growth in resource 
productivity as a. The difference between the rate of growth in production and the 
growth of resource use is crucial. We can identify three alternative environmental 
paths: 
a>0    
a=0 
a<0 
One obvious objective for a green strategy is to increase resource productivity (a>0). 
The more ambitious strategy would be to actually reduce resource use per period of 
time in absolute terms over time (r<0).5 
r=y-a      (4) 
may be rewritten as  
r=n+t+q-a    (5) 
 r<0 implies that 
n+t+q<a    (6) 
 
Let us first assume that we refer to a mature economy where resource use per capita is 
very big. In such an economy the employment volume and the normal working hours 
per employee may be assumed to remain constant. In this case it is a requirement for a 
gradual reduction of resource use per time period that resource productivity grows at a 
higher rate than labor productivity.  
a>q     (7) 
Since 2000 labour productivity has been stagnating in many of the mature economies 
– q has been growing with less than 1-3% per annum. Is it possible to reach a growth 
                                                 
5 In some cases the requirement is to reduce the use of a specific resource (carbon) with high rates in 
order to avoid ecological crisis (global warming). 
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in resource productivity that is higher than 3% per annum? The answer is of course 
different for different resources.  
One reason for optimism could be that for historical reasons the dominating technical 
trajectory has been to develop systems that increase labor productivity while much 
less attention has been given to the increase resource productivity. But to change the 
attention will require strong and clear incentives in terms of taxes, rationing and 
sanctions of resource abuse. A successful strategy would result in new patterns of 
investments that are resource saving rather than labor saving. 
Ecological economists such as Sanders (2012) are skeptical to this kind of reasoning 
and he rightly points to the fact that increasing resource productivity will lower the 
price and this might through substitution and income effects actually increase the use 
of the resource so that we end up with a situation where: 
a<q     (8) 
This implies that incentives need to be continuously adapted and be made stronger 
over time to counter such effects.  Sanders adds the argument that it will be 
increasingly difficult to attain high rates of growth in resource productivity because of 
diminishing returns. This might be the case for some resources although the opposite 
may also be the case. Moving toward more sustainable solutions may involve virtuous 
circles. It took quite a while before the historical secular growth in labor productivity 
ran into diminishing returns. 
But of course there are limits for how far problems can be solved by increasing 
resource productivity. It is obvious that in the very long run any non-renewable 
resource will be used up if the R is not brought down to zero.  The time frame of the 
analysis is obviously important. This has been a problematic issue to handle in the 
limits to growth discussions we will show in the next section. 
The IPAT formulation. 
Another way to formulate the trade off between growth and development takes 
departure from the well-known   “Ehrlich   equation”.   This   equation   comes   in   several  
versions and has influenced much of the growth-environment debate.  The most 
common formulation is simply  called  “the  IPAT  equation”: 
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I=PAT     (9) 
I=Environmental impact;  
P=Population;  
A= Affluence;  
T=Technology; 
The environmental impact of human activities (i.e. human production and 
consumption in broad sense including formal as well as informal sectors) is the 
product of the size of the population, its prosperity (which corresponds to aggregate 
income per capita in the section above) and the technology used. 
There has been much discussion about which of the three factors (P, A and T) that 
matters most. Ehrlich and Holdren (1972) have underlined population growth as the 
basic and most serious problem, while Commoner (1972) has put the blame almost 
exclusively on the specific kinds of technological development that has accompanied 
economic growth, especially after World War II, affecting ecosystem structure and 
functioning. Examples are detergent phosphate, fertilizer nitrogen, synthetic 
pesticides and tetraethyl lead. Already in the 1970s there was a fierce discussion 
between Ehrlich and Holdren on the one side and Commoner on the other. The 
discussion revealed, amongst other things, both the importance of avoiding ambiguity 
in the definitions of the variables and the necessity to take interactions between them 
on board. Furthermore, it became clear that if technical change has the power to 
increase negative environmental impacts it also has the power to do the opposite. 
It is mainly biologists and ecologists that use the IPAT equation. But since the root of 
the problems is not nature but human behavior in natural and social settings several 
reformulations   of   the   “master   equation   in   industrial   ecology”,   as   it   is   sometimes  
called, have been proposed. This may be done in many ways of course, some more 
helpful than others. 6 
                                                 
6 I=aPbAcTde; (e is an error term) which has been suggested by Deitz and Rosa (1994, 
97,   98)   may   ring   some   bells   for   economists   but   doesn’t   really   increase   our  
understanding. 
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IPAT and its reformulations have functioned as catalysts for much of the literature 
and debate on environmental/ecological problems. In all their simplicity they put the 
limitation of our choices into focus. Furthermore, since the possibilities to control and 
significantly limit both the population growth and the seemingly permanent quest for 
increasing production and consumption are seriously circumscribed the only remotely 
possible way to address the environmental problems seems to lie in new technology. 
However,  such  “technological”  solutions require major changes in the character and 
direction of technical change. The question if such radical changes are realistic, if at 
all possible, has also become a recurring theme in the debate as reflected in the notion 
of      “Factor  X”:   “How many times is it possible for the amount of wealth extracted 
from one unit of natural resources (the resource productivity) to increase within a 
certain time span as a result of technological improvements and is this sufficient for 
sustainable development?”   Or   what   is the realistic sustained rate of growth of 
resource productivity growth (=a). 
Ecological economics approaches to limits to growth. 
The IPAT formulation of environmental/ecological restrictions on economic process 
has a Malthusian ring. Some things (population and affluence) have an inherent 
tendency to expand beyond quite inelastic limits (i.e. there are limits to how much 
“impact”   the   environment   can   absorb   and   this   spells   catastrophe,   sooner   or   later).  
Constraints on economic activity set by Nature have been a recurring topic from the 
birth of political economy as a scientific discipline. The Physiocrats regarded the 
productive power of land as the source of all economic value. Ricardo referred to the 
“original   and   indestructible  powers  of   the   soil”   and   the uneven quality of land as a 
productive factor was the basis for his theory of income distribution. More recently 
Biophysical limits to growth have been much discussed within the new discipline of 
“ecological  economics”.   
Kenneth Boulding and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen  inspired much of this debate. 
Boulding’s  article  “The  Economics  of   the  Coming  Spaceship  Earth”  (1966)  first  put  
the question on the agenda and his reformulation of the process of production as an 
evolutionary interaction between energy, materials and knowledge (Boulding 1978, 
1981) was seminal for the whole approach. For the discussion of the distribution of 
income and wealth in the short and medium term it may be adequate to regard 
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production as resulting from combinations of labor and capital, he argued. In order to 
understand societies long run opportunities, however, the focus must be on energy, 
materials and knowledge. The crucial factor is the evolution of knowledge. But 
production of goods or services can never be totally decoupled from energy and 
materials and how we handle the inescapable dependence of production on energy 
and materials determines our future.  
Box: Energy, materials and knowledge and three kinds of scarcity  
At the very core of economic theory we find the issue of more or less efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. Sanders (2012) argues that one reason why economics 
and economists cannot deal with sustainability is that the kind of scarcity that they 
operate with is relative rather than absolute. Markets cannot allocate non renewable 
resources. In our own work we have argued that standard economics has a problem 
with dealing with knowledge since knowledge is a resource that is enhanced by use. 
When people use their skills these skills are further developed. 
At a general level this opens up for the possibility that human learning can be 
mobilized to overcome the absolute scarcity of non-renewable resources. But it would 
require a society and institutional set up where learning is both intensified and given a 
clear direction. We do not see the current version of capitalism as offering such a set-
up.   
 
Boulding emphasized that human behavior is embedded in a larger interconnected 
system. To understand the consequences of our behavior, economic or otherwise, we 
must first develop a scientific understanding of the   “ecodynamics”   of   the   general  
system, the global society in which we live, in its material as well as non-material 
dimensions. For all practical purposes the Earth is a closed ecological system and our 
future depends on if we can develop an economic and social system with a 
“throughput”   of  matter   and   energy   that   respects   the   ecological   limits.  With   a   slight  
reformulation of Boulding we can say that this is the ultimate challenge for the 
learning economy. 
Boulding didn’t  believe  that  “exponential  growth  in  a  limited  world  ”  is  possible,  but  
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he was not very clear about how and when the limits would materialize. Georgescu-
Roegen (1971) was more outspokenly pessimistic. He discussed the constraints to the 
economic process   from   a   thermodynamic   perspective:   “The   entropic   nature   of   the  
economic   process”.  Georgescu-Roegen argued that the economic process inevitably 
transforms valuable natural resources (low entropy) into waste (high entropy). The 
universe is moving irreversibly from relatively ordered states to the chaotic outcome 
of maximum disorder or entropy. Low entropy is scarce, energy is a limiting factor to 
the economic process and society is anchored to a material base with distinct 
constraints and it evolves in a unidirectional irreversible way. The natural constraints 
on  the  economic  process  can’t  forever  be  solved  by  technological  means.  The  laws  of  
thermodynamics imply limits to the substitution of physical capital for natural capital. 
In the long run they are complements because physical capital requires materials and 
energy for its production and maintenance. 
In continuance of the discussion of biophysical limits to growth the question of  the 
uncertainty about the environmental effects of economic activity has been raised 
(Constanza et al. 1997).  These uncertainties are increasing for example in the wake 
of climate change, which also leads to additional irreversible damages to ecosystems.  
Climate change was not yet on the agenda when Boulding and Georgescu-Roegen 
formulated their warnings, but it seems clear that this development only makes the 
questions they raised more pertinent. 
Limits to limiting growth.  
From a pragmatic point of view it is clear that even if the limits imposed by the 
entropy law only will severely restrict the economic process in the very long run there 
are good reasons to act already now since the signals sent by global warming, climate 
change, ongoing resource depletion, damaged ecosystems, desertification, smog in 
high-growth regions, etc. already are serious enough. There are good reasons to put 
environmentally motivated restrictions on the economic process, some of which will 
limit economic growth as it is conceptualized and measured today.  
This will not come by itself and it will not be straight forward. As Georgescu-Roegen 
(1975) puts it:   “But anyone who believes that he can draw a blueprint for the 
ecological salvation of the human species does not understand the nature of evolution, 
or even of history -- which is that of permanent struggle in continuously novel forms, 
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not that of a predictable, controllable physico-chemical process, such as boiling an 
egg or launching  a  rocket  to  the  moon.” 
Unwanted   and   unplanned   reductions   of   economic   growth   don’t   effectively   solve  
environmental problems, which otherwise could serve as a comfort in the current 
troubled times. It does not remove or reverse environmental damages already done, 
and   it   doesn’t   necessarily   prevent   current   rates   of   environmental   destruction   from  
continuing more or less unabated (see box below). Moreover, decision-makers often 
react to reduced economic growth in ways, which hurt the environment rather than 
help it. Investments in cleaner technologies are postponed, cheaper and more 
polluting fuels are substituted for cleaner more expensive ones, etc. 
Box: The crisis has not helped reducing CO2 emissions and global 
warming 
In the annual environmental performance report it is demonstrated that the carbon 
This  year‘s  Climate  Change  Performance   Index   (CCPI)  shows  some   interesting and 
worrying results: 
■   In  2010,   the  most   recent  data  period   for   this  year‘s  CCPI,   the  world   saw  another  
record breaking increase in global CO2 emissions. Not only have global emissions 
risen to another all time high, but this increase has also been the steepest emissions 
surge in history. 
■  Not   only   are   emissions   rising   at   the   global   level.  As  well   at   the   national   level   is  
little good news to tell. Not one of the examined countries has managed to change to a 
development path that is compatible with limiting global warming substantially below 
2  °C.  No  country‘s  effort   is  deemed  sufficient   to  prevent  dangerous  climate  change.  
Therefore, as in the years before, we still cannot award any country with 1st, 2nd or 
3rd place. 
 
Another problem is that economic welfare theory has supported a kind of market-
ideology based resistance to all serious environmental policy measures except the 
ones  within  the  ‘market  failure’  approach.  Many people oppose or give low priority to 
the radical measures that are needed to deal with climate change. Hence such 
measures are Pareto suboptimal. If the measures are so radical that it is unlikely that 
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we can compensate the losers according to Kaldor –Hicks principles than we should 
abstain from action. Welfare theory actually forbids us to counteract serious 
ecological threats. Hence, to be successful, any government committed to the 
protection of the natural environment must campaign on the basis of moral 
imperatives and not rely on self-interest and calculus of pecuniary costs and benefits 
(Hodgson 2012). 
But governments themselves are too much focused upon the short term. This is 
illustrated by the high discount rates used when assessing the usefulness of public 
investments. In many countries governments operate with discount rates are set at 5-
6% and that result in neglect of the long terms needs for sustainability. In an 
economic situation with big reserves of unemployed labour a lower discount rate 
would be a way to create green jobs both in the short and the long run. 
As Scitovsky (1980) has pointed out, capitalism works best when it is flexible. Its 
capacity to generate technical and organizational change has been its main advantage, 
politically as well as economically. It has scored much worse on matters of equity. 
The experimental character of capitalism connected to its incentive structure and 
decentralized decision structure has allowed it to expand into new directions when 
stagnating in the former growth areas. The most important strength of capitalism is, 
thus, connected to economic growth.  
This rather positive assessment of what capitalism has been able to attain needs to be 
confronted with the more recent experience of the financial crisis and its aftermaths. 
The extreme growth in the financial sector brought the mature economies into a 
process   of   ‘negative   growth’   and  neither   production   nor   consumption   have   reached  
again the pre-crisis level. One paradox is that the outcome is a situation where the 
financial sector has strengthened its dominant position not only in the economy but 
also in relation to politics. Rather than reining in the financial institutions 
governments try to adjust their behavior to what they expect financial markets to 
accept. Hereby they can obtain low interest rates and attract capital. 
One consequence of this accumulation mode dominated by financial capital is that 
income inequality has increased and that governments are afraid to attack the causes 
of growing inequality. The decoupling of finance from production has consequences 
for the sustainability of  capitalist  growth.  While  ‘production  focused’  capitalism  has  
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driven  our  economies   toward  unsustainable  growth   ‘financial  dominated’  capitalism  
is even further away from the reality of natural resource. Here nature appears as 
figures on boards for commodity trade. 
 
How important is growth? 
One   basic   cause   of   growth   lies   in   people’s   ability   and   willingness   to   engage   in  
consumer   learning.   Even   when   basic   needs   for   “comfort”   become   saturated  
consumers go on establishing new consumer wants. This is of course strongly 
stimulated by both direct and indirect sales efforts exposing consumers to what should 
be seen as model life styles. Consumers form new wants and habits when innovation 
activities of firms make it possible and it certainly makes policies for reduced growth 
difficult. 
Economically as well as politically it is difficult to decouple the economy from 
growth. How important, then, is economic growth for our possibilities to live the lives 
we have reason to value? It is well known that economic growth is not the same as 
economic development and that there are many reasons why economic growth may 
not  deliver  the  expected  increases  in  human  wellbeing.  The  “freedoms”  discussed  by  
Sen (1999), which deeply affect human well-being, i.e. political freedoms, economic 
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security, do not 
automatically improve as a result of economic growth. Furthermore, the distribution 
of   income,   wealth   and   power   doesn’t   seem   to   be   positively   affected   by   economic 
growth.  
Empirical research shows that to a large extent people give higher priority to other 
values than the ones most clearly delivered by economic growth. In his book 
“Happiness”  Layard  sums  a   large   amount  of   empirical   research  up   in   the   following  
way:  “So  what  really  does  affect  us?  Seven  factors  stand  out:  our  family  relationships,  
our financial situation, our work, our community and friends, our health, our personal 
freedom and our personal values. Except for health and income, they are all 
concerned  with  the  quality  of  our  relationships”  (Layard  2005). 
One of the researchers Layard refers to is Easterlin (1998). Commenting on the many 
new good and services that has been developed during the last two centuries Easterlin 
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asks if there is reason to think that some sort of saturation or culmination will occur: 
“The  answer  suggested  by  the  evidence  considered  here  is  that  economic  growth  does  
not raise a society to some ultimate state of plenty. Rather, the growth process itself 
engenders  ever  growing  “needs”  that  lead  it  ever  onward.”  (Easterlin  1998). 
Another limitation of the ability of economic growth to deliver increasing well-being 
is put forward by Fred Hirsh (1976). According to him economic growth results in 
increasing positional competition both in areas where scarcity is social and material.  
A typical example of the first type is the competition for jobs in leading positions. 
People use more and more functionally unnecessary education to compete for a 
strictly limited number of jobs. Competition for a physically limited number of good 
spots to build recreational houses, driving prices higher and higher, is an example of 
the second type. Both cases are close to zero-sum situations. To the extent that 
economic growth is driven by positional competition the positive welfare effects will 
be very limited. 
There are, thus, a number of good reasons to be skeptical about the alleged ability of 
economic growth to produce human well-being.  However, as long as there on 
balance is a positive effect, however small, of growth on well-being, which seems to 
be the position taken by most economists, economic growth may be defended as a 
policy goal.  
Especially in low-income countries it is, for obvious reasons, difficult to build a 
broadly convincing case against growth in spite of its often clear negative 
environmental   effects.   Even   within   Amartya   Sen’s   definition   of   well-being as 
anchored in rights and freedoms the need for food and shelter and also for access to 
education and learning cannot be realized with the current distribution of resources 
and it will require economic growth in specific regions to give such rights and 
freedoms.  
Can growth become sustainable under current capitalism?  
One can discuss pro et contra for economic growth as a policy goal in many ways. 
One can build strong arguments for restricting it for environmental reasons. One 
difficulty with envisaging sustainable growth is that growth is strongly connected 
both to the modern nation state and to the prevailing economic system. Capitalism 
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works best when it is flexible and expanding. Long term controlled zero growth (or 
even low growth) under capitalism requires a political regulation system with a 
strength  and  sophistication  we  haven’t  yet  seen.  Without  such  a  regulation  system  it  
would not in a long-term, low-growth scenario, be possible to avoid increasing 
regional and sector specific unemployment and a host of problems related to the 
distribution of income, wealth and power.  
It is impossible to say anything with certainty about the possibility to implement the 
technical and institutional changes that would make economic growth compatible 
with reasonable definitions of environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, optimism 
about this topic seems to have been increasing lately and even if it is not clear what 
this change in outlook rests upon we now turn to a discussion what can be done to 
make growth more environmentally sustainable. We would point to a change in 
governance  that  would  move  us  toward  ‘democratic  and  participatory  engineering  and 
management  of  growth’.   
In order to reduce the environmental impact in terms of natural resources, low entropy 
energy and ecosystems resilience the focus evidently has to be on the creation and 
utilization of knowledge. This is in accordance with the approach of ecological 
economics discussed above. Quite generally, final demand should be, increasingly, 
composed of good and services with low environmental impact and technological and 
organizational knowledge should systematically be developed towards the same goal. 
Progress in any of the following dimensions would move us in the right direction: 
a) New processes (production, transport and logistics) requiring less resource 
input per unit of production 
b) Substituting non-renewable with renewable resources 
c) New products which are more long lasting and more recyclable 
d) A change in the sectoral composition of the economy toward less resource 
intensive production activities 
e) A change in the location of economic activities that reduce resource use 
for transport 
f) New forms of agglomerations and new principles for housing that reduce 
resource use 
The question is how such developments can be supported. We will discuss some main 
channels for this. The speed and character of the environmental destruction connected 
to the economic process will be profoundly affected by what happens to values, 
institutions, and policies. A specific but very important issue is the geographical 
distribution of the economic process. In that context the environmental effects of 
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urbanization, especially city growth, will also be discussed. Finally we will take into 
consideration some aspects of the consumption structure, which, as argued above, is 
of key importance. 
Values.  
If people feel strongly about the environment and rank environmental values high this 
will make implementation of environmental protection policies more likely and it will 
support institutional change in this direction. It will also make it easier to shape more 
environment friendly consumer habits. The good thing is that values and expectations 
about the future are malleable. The values connected to expected future increases in 
material living standards my, for example, change in a more modest direction. 
But where will such values come from? Values are shaped in complex process over 
time  and  there  are  no  guarantees  that  new  “good  values”  will  automatically  emerge  to  
protect the social fabric when needed. Environmental destruction will not necessarily 
produce new values to protect the environment once people realize that there is a 
serious threat. It is true that the increasing focus on the environment in the public 
debate and the increasing scientific knowledge about the character of the threats have 
resulted in a broadening environmental awareness. In for example the Euro Barometer 
questionnaires people tend to place environment problems as one of the most 
important questions for the future. Lately, however, the environment problem in the 
broad  sense  including  climate  change  has  lost  some  of  its  urgency  in  people’s  minds.  
The international crisis seems to retard the development of stronger environmental 
values. Also the widespread and increasing individualism of our times in the Western 
cultures holds such values back. Concern for the environment is a collective concern, 
i.e. a concern for something that is common for many people, in fact for the whole 
mankind.  This  doesn’t  fit  very  well  with  the  surging  individualism.   
The unequal distribution of income between countries is connected to powerful 
demonstration effects. Consumption patterns in high-income countries are sought 
copied in low-income countries. Relentless consumerism building on fast consumer 
learning spreads over the globe. This means that values that induce more 
environmental friendly consumption patterns have to be developed first in the rich 
countries. An increasing attention among both producers and consumers to 
economizing with environmental resources has to be built through a combination of 
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regulations and incentives. The US and Europe has to lead the development of 
environmental values. Urging the fast growing emerging economies to take their 
“fair”   share   of   the   responsibility   for   the   global   environment   (as   seems   to   be   the  
present stand of most high income countries) will not sound convincing to these 
countries and will not make consumer values more sustainable. 
Another strategic player in the global game is of course China. China has set a world 
records both in rates in economic growth and in terms of local pollution. But the 
political leaders have recognized the problem and have taken initiatives that may 
make a difference in the long run. The explosive growth in some green industries like 
Solar and Wind energy has been nurtured by public policy. Recently China has 
decided to introduce a carbon tax. On the other hand the rate  of  installment  of  ‘clean  
production’   and   renewable   energy   sources   has   been   less   impressive.  Also   in  China  
local interests and pressure groups will slow down the movement toward a green 
technological trajectory. Another crucial issue is if China will be willing to join global 
agreements that restrain their capacity to pursue national self-interest. The growth 
trajectory as well as the general political strategy has been based upon offering 
citizens access to material progress and to change the value sets of Chinese consumers 
might be at least as difficult as changing them in the US and Europe.   
We do not expect major impact from isolated moral campaigns in favor of good green 
behavior on the behavior consumers, workers, farmers, managers and capitalists. A 
problem with the global ecological crisis is that the individual actor tends to see 
his/her share of responsibility for the environment as so marginal that even those who 
accept that the problem is important will be reluctant to change behavior. But we do 
expect that there can be quite substantial changes in what are the most widely 
accepted norms. But such changes will be based more upon new institutional 
frameworks and regulations than upon moral preaching.  
Institutions and policies. 
Deep changes in economic behavior (i.e. changes in the ways research organizations 
prioritize between different tracks to pursue, changes in the ways firms develop and 
chose product- and process technologies, changes in how consumers distribute their 
purchases and changes in how politicians strive for and reach power) imply deep 
changes in the institutional framework. Less and less doubt remains about the 
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necessity of drastic changes in economic behavior if something remotely similar to 
environmentally sustainable development is to be achieved. Hence a broad range of 
deep institutional reforms must be put on the agenda. 
In this context the institutions of the learning society are the central ones. Three types 
of changes have to be supported: Energy efficiency has to be increased, low carbon 
technologies have to be worked out, environment friendly goods and services have to 
be developed and, of course, consumers have to prefer and buy them. The often-
underlined necessity to halt deforestation (Nicolas Stern 2009) may here be thought of 
as included in development of low carbon technologies. This means that institutional 
learning and policy learning on broad fronts are necessary. Taxes, carbon trading, 
regulation, technology support, and measures that halt deforestation may be 
mentioned. New instruments and new ways of using them have to be built up in these 
areas. Deeper environmental awareness and new visions about the relations between 
environment and society, foresight, data collection, theory development, new 
environmental bureaucracies, new forms of cooperation between the research system 
and the political system, new legal and regulatory frameworks have to be developed.  
It is difficult or impossible to describe in detail the depth and breadth of the necessary 
changes. Development of institutions and policies has to support each other partly by 
design and partly by evolution. Because of the immense magnitude of the 
environmental challenge inclusive political and economic institutions are called for 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Inclusive institutions distribute power and economic 
influence  widely,  establish  legally  binding  restraints  on  the  people  in  power  (“the  rule  
of  law”),  secure  property  rights  and  create  incentives  for  large  parts  of  the  population  
to invest in learning and participate not only in production but also in its management. 
If institutions are not inclusive enough the creative destruction of vested interests, 
which so often block necessary new policies, will be obstructed. The structural 
change, which is needed in sustainable growth and development, will be too slow. To 
draw the development and implementation of technologies in directions that can 
significantly retard the present accumulation of environmental problems may very 
well require development not only of a wide range of new institutions but also of 
institutions that include broad majorities of the population into political and economic 
decision-making. This may adequately be called deep institutional change.  
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The fact that the Nordic countries with their small size, high taxes, strong trade unions 
and generous unemployment support have become among the most successful 
economies worldwide both in quantitative (GNP) and qualitative (well-being and 
happiness indexes) terms is a paradox seen in the light of neo-liberal dogma. Danish 
experts doing research on the labor market and the welfare state have referred to this 
in   terms   of   ‘bumble-bee’-economies. The parallel is underestimating the paradox 
since the Nordic countries have been more successful in terms of   ‘flying’   than   the  
other species among national economies. 
Social inclusion is an important aspect of this. On the basis of our own research we 
would   explain  much   of   the   success   by   ‘social   capital’   and   refer   to   the   capacity   of  
citizens to enter into collaboration with others that do not belong to their primary 
group. This is reflected in high levels of trust making business transactions as well 
interactive learning across organizational borders more effective than in other national 
contexts. Historically at  the  level  of  the  national  political  systems  ‘class  co-operation’  
has been fundamental when responding to deep crisis.  Finally, it is reflected in wider 
active participation in processes of organizational change and organizational learning 
at the level of the workplace. 
With reference to these characteristics we have argued that the Nordic countries have 
a   competitive   advantage   in   ‘the   learning   economy’.   We   believe   that   the   same  
characteristics, if taken properly into account, could be used to give the Nordic 
countries a lead position in relation to the shaping of a new Green Innovation 
Trajectory. The kind of deep transformation in consumption and production pattern 
that is necessary can only take place with some degree of broad participation. 
Egalitarian societies may be more ready to go green than societies with high degrees 
of inequality.7 
A critically important issue is how the many necessary institutional changes are 
connected to the process of globalization and to the regulation power of nation-states. 
In a situation where nation states compete politically and economically with each 
other they are not ready to go alone with policies and institutional changes that risk 
affecting competitiveness negatively. If international cooperation and regulation can’t  
                                                 
7 It is interesting to note that Denmark and Sweden take the fourth and fifth position in the national 
ranking published by The Climate Change Performance Index 2013. Position 1-3 are left empty since 
they require a diminished foot-print and no country succeeded to attain that.   
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be established environmental destruction may continue in spite of a political will for 
increased environmental protection.  
Historically nation states in Europe and elsewhere have served as frameworks for 
uniquely high rates economic growth. High rates of growth have made it possible to 
establish a welfare state and helped to create class compromise. The current global 
governance system is strongly rooted in this history and new emerging economies 
such as China and India also use national political institutions to foster rapid 
economic growth. There is a strong connection between the nation state as institution 
and current economic growth trajectories. 
In modern terminology this becomes especially clear when governments focus upon 
increasing international competitiveness. The idea is that welfare, employment and 
growth requires that domestic firms and experts have conditions that are at least as 
attractive as those found in other countries. In its most crude form competitiveness is 
reduced to the level of wages or wage costs per unit of production. Business lobbyists 
are especially active when it comes to use the competitiveness argument to promote 
self-interest. They use it to call both for lower wages and for lower taxes. 
Increasingly the efforts of governments to respond to the ecological challenge by 
taxes on pollution and resource use has become attacked at the national level because 
they undermine the competitiveness of domestic firms or make it less attractive for 
foreign firms to invest in the country. This tendency has actually been reinforced in 
connection with the financial crisis. In Europe the strategy to cope with the euro crisis 
has   been   launched   as   a   ‘competitiveness   pact’.   This   focus   upon   national  
competitiveness may have contradictory impact upon the use of resources. On the one 
hand it reduces the rate of growth in production but on the other hand it slows down 
the increase in resource productivity. Industries that pollute and operate resource 
intensive activities are sheltered in order to avoid more job loss. 
One way to overcome the competitiveness trap is of course to make global or at least 
international agreements on environmental regulation. The capacity to engage in such 
transnational agreements will be of decisive importance for the possibility to move 
toward sustainable development. This requires a major change in perspective. As it 
stands  today  the  nation  state  remains  a  ‘natural’  arena  for  discourse  and  action.  Even  
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in   critical   contributions   to   social   science   ‘methodological   nationalism’   tends   to  
prevail.  
Structural change. 
To ease and induce restructuring of production and consumption is an integrated part 
of making economic growth more sustainable. To increase energy efficiency in 
production will change the structure of production broadly speaking. Choice and 
development of materials, methods of production, and machinery by firms will be 
affected at all stages of production.  As mentioned above several policy instruments 
are available to affect these choices. Knowledge about how different structures of 
production and different production methods affect the environment may thus be 
utilized in policy making.  
Looked upon in this way the structure of production is an induced, indirect reflection 
of choices made by firms in their ongoing pursuit of profits and capital accumulation. 
But the specialization pattern of the economy can also be thought of as a policy 
instrument in a more direct way. Environmental policies may aim at drawing final 
consumer demand in more sustainable directions. Also here there are, of course, 
several policy instruments, most of them affect consumer choice through changed 
price relations while others use more direct regulation.  
Of course, many improvements, for example in energy-efficiency, are not 
achievements of policy-making but rather results from long term trends in structural 
change, such as the shift from industrial society to a service-based economy. Even the 
successful case of California, which has held per-capita energy use roughly constant 
for the last 40 years whereas it has risen by about 40 percent in the rest of the U.S., 
only about one quarter of the improvements, can be explained by policy-making 
efforts to increase efficiency.  
An indirect, small-step policy instrument, which may complement the traditional ones 
is  “nudging”.  It  has  recently  been  suggested  that in many cases decision-making can 
be  “nudged”  into  a  certain  directions  without  altering  the  available  choices  much. “A 
nudge can be anything that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count 
as a nudge, the intervention must  be  easy  and  cheap  to  avoid”.  (Thaler and Sunstein 
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2008). This approach is sometimes called  “libertarian  paternalism”.   
But the nudge idea may be pushed a bit further by not only taking into account what 
would be best for the individual, but by also going for generally acknowledged 
political goals like environmental protection. It matches the usual nudging criteria if 
there is scientific evidence that action is needed and there is wide political consensus. 
Nudging could, thus, be applied also to technology choice. A board of experts from 
various scientific disciplines could be appointed to compose a catalog of criteria that a 
technology for environmental reasons has to meet8. If a technology scores high, 
because it induces very low energy-consumption for example, it could qualify to 
governmental funding or promotion. The technological nudges resulting from such a 
process could be supported by, for instance, making them the default choice in 
publically funded institutes like schools and hospitals.  
Some progress has already been made along these mostly indirect and incremental 
lines to change consumption patterns. It is more questionable if significant reductions 
in  consumers’  strong  “addiction  to  exosomatic  comfort”  are  possible. 
To follow the progress in structural change toward sustainability it would be useful to 
give much more attention to and to refine Input-Output analysis so that both 
knowledge and natural resources are given a more significant position as inputs and 
outputs. Input-output analysis can give as full a picture of the overall economy as 
general equilibrium but it is free from the ideological assumptions that markets are the 
best tools to allocate resources. 
Environment and the city.  
Economic growth is inextricably linked to urbanization and city growth. Those 
regions and countries that experience economic growth also tend to urbanize quickly 
and those urbanizing faster typically experience higher rate of economic growth. No 
country has ever achieved sustained economic growth without urbanizing and 
countries with the highest per capita income tend to be more urbanized (UN-
HABITAT 2010). 
                                                 
8 This could be combined with the engagement of ordinary citizens through tools such as consensus 
conferences where citizens make choices together on the basis of the expert knowledge that they are 
offered at the conference. 
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Cities have always been locations for the main producers of new knowledge and 
vehicles for economic growth. This is because density, diversity and interaction feed 
innovation and since the extent to which economic growth can be decoupled from 
environmental destruction hinges on learning and innovation the way cities develop 
may very well be crucial in this respect. There are several ways in which cities may 
help economic growth to become cleaner. Large groups of people living and working 
in close proximity put strains on natural resources and energy and create different 
kinds of pollution. But in creative periods and environments city development has 
also been characterized by astute recognition of such problems and mobilization of 
efforts to solve them. Cities contribute to a more sustainable development by on the 
one hand clearly demonstrating problems that need to be solved and on the other hand 
by providing creative environments for the solution of these problems. 
In addition to this dense populations use far less energy and materials per capita on 
living, heating, and transport than more dispersed populations. Increased and 
improved public transport has, especially in cities, great potential to reduce carbon 
emission. Furthermore, waste management and waste treatment are much more 
efficient in cities than in less urbanized areas. In fact in the last decades many cities 
have gone from net emission to net reduction of greenhouse gases in waste 
management mainly as result of enhanced energy- and material recovery. Waste 
prevention systems may add to the benefits already achieved (Johnson et al. 2011).  
The next decades China, India and other big, fast-growing countries will continue to 
urbanize rapidly. The ways their cities will develop will have a huge impact on energy 
consumption and carbon emission. Urbanization and city growth are main factors 
affecting the natural environment of the future world (Glaeser 2011).  
Are there alternative to the current version of capitalism that could 
cope with the sustainability problem? 
So far capitalism has proved to be quite resilient when confronted with crises that 
could threaten its survival. The big wars and the crisis in the 1930s transformed 
capitalism into different varieties that could combine the interest of those at the top 
with the majority of the electorate and in the West the political groups that challenge 
the system are only marginal and they only show up spontaneously in the form of 
anti-global and anti-Wall Street.  
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Therefore it may appear far-fetched just to think about alternatives to capitalism and 
what we can imagine is probably a new variety than a completely different system. 
One way to specify what is wrong with current capitalism is to specify four differents 
forms of capital that shape growth. 
Diagram 1: Resources fundamental for economic growth – combining 
the tangible and reproducible dimensions  
 Easily reproducible 
resources 
Less reproducible 
resources 
Tangible resources 1. Production capital 2. Natural capital 
Intangible resources 3. Intellectual capital 4. Social capital 
 
The diagram illustrates that economic growth is faced with a double challenge in 
terms of sustainability and that there is an immanent risk of undermining not only the 
material basis of material production (Segura-Bonilla 1999), but also the knowledge 
base. The creation of tangible capital may be threatened by a neglect of environmental 
sustainability. We will argue that the production and efficient use of intellectual 
capital is fundamentally depending upon social capital (Woolcock 1998). A 
development strategy that focuses only on production capital and intellectual capital is 
not sustainable. 
But the diagram is incomplete – we might say that it is like playing Hamlet without 
the Prince of Denmark. Over the last decade it has become increasingly clear that 
financial capital has become less connected to the other forms of capital and at the 
same time the form of capital that dominates capitalist dynamics.  Financial capital 
attracts the best brains and it increasingly set the limits for what kind of public 
policies that can be implemented. It is difficult to see how there could be a change in 
the accumulation pattern without reducing the power of financial capital. 
It is not easy to formulate a way out of this. Socialist planned economies have not, as 
was hoped by many people, been able to show another way. The problems with 
technical change, flexibility and democracy were not effectively tackled in the Soviet 
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Union or the other counties within the same paradigm of socialist economy and few 
people would pick The Peoples Republic of China, Vietnam or Cuba as role models in 
this   context.     We   can’t   rule   out,   of   course,   that   another   type   of   socialist   economy,  
dynamic, democratic and with effective environmental regulation, can be established, 
but visions about how this may be done are at the moment in very short supply. 
There is a need for a pragmatic engineering perspective rather than a dogmatic 
marketeer perspective. The actual degree of scarcity must become the starting point 
for developing strategies where markets and planning instruments are used in a 
management fashion with broad participation of citizens. To organize such a form of 
governance at the national level is a tremendous task. It is of course even more so at 
the transnational level. Europe and its institutions will soon be tested in these respect. 
Europe could become a model but it would require forms of leadership that so far 
have been out of sight.  
Innovation and sustainability  
In this section we present some ideas on how innovation may contribute to a more 
sustainable path of development. We will refer to the kinds of changes that we listed 
above as different kinds of changes that move us toward sustainability: 
a) New processes (production, transport and logistics) requiring less resource 
input per unit of production 
b) Substituting non-renewable with renewable resources 
c) New consumer products which are more long lasting and more recyclable 
d) A change in the sectoral composition of the economy toward less resource 
intensive production activities 
e) A change in the location of economic activities that reduce resource use 
for transport 
f) New forms of agglomerations and new principles for housing that reduce 
resource use 
 
Before addressing each of these we will come with general reflections on an 
innovation oriented approach to sustainability. 
General reflections on innovation and sustainability 
A significant amount of current innovation efforts undermine sustainability. One 
example is product innovations for consumers that are designated and designed 
exclusively to stimulate   consumers’   appetite   for   new   models.   Another   example   is  
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process innovations that lead to more use of resource per unit of value produced. In a 
market economy process innovations that make resource intensive products less 
expensive will move the production structure in the wrong direction. Therefore it is 
necessary   to   redefine   innovation   policy   from   ‘general   innovation   support’   toward  
‘directed  innovation  support’.  While  it  is  impossible  to  steer  learning  and  innovation  
processes in detail history gives  many   examples   of   how   they  might   be   ‘guided’   by  
governments and actually end up with economies following a new technological 
trajectory. 
If scientists are correct in their conclusions that there is urgency to cope with global 
warming it is obvious that market forces cannot solve the problem without guidance 
or   the   state   taking   on   the   role   of   Entrepreneur.   The   ‘effective   demand’   of   future  
generations is zero. Therefore there is a need for forces outside the marketplace to 
intervene in a very strong way. It does not exclude the use of market mechanisms and 
it does not imply central planning and total loss of autonomy for agents in the private 
sector. The need for creativity and entrepreneurship with both individuals and 
organizations  ‘thinking  out  of  the  box’  may  actually  be  bigger  than  ever. 
Guidance may take the form of a combination of taxes, subsidies, public production, 
public procurement, standard settings and prohibitions. One important criterion for 
selecting and designing policy tools must be how they affect innovation and learning. 
There is for instance a scholarly literature on how the design of standards may 
respectively promote or slow down innovations. Measures should be designed not so 
that they freeze procedures. They should give freedom in choice of method as long as 
the outcome is that specific green objectives are reached. 
One of the arguments against such guidance is that the measures taken are costly and 
that given the uncertainty regarding the future we should postpone the introduction of 
such measures, while we in the meantime create more knowledge through R&D 
efforts. By pursuing R&D we can when the time comes introduce much more 
effective and much less costly solutions. This argument has been the second position 
taken by Bjørn Lomborg – the skeptical environmentalist.9 It reveals a lack of 
                                                 
9 For a long period he was in denial when it comes to global warming. At some point when this 
position was not possible to defend he turned to the new position that research is what should be done 
now.  
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understanding of the innovation process assuming it to be linear rather than 
interactive. One of the clearest conclusions from innovation research is that effective 
new solutions can only be developed in a process where research efforts are applied 
and where there is feedback from users to producers of new solutions. 
We have referred to the very fundamental institutional problem that nation states 
dominate political governance. They have the most powerful tools when it comes to 
intervene while some of the most important environmental problems are transnational 
and global. There are two types of responses to this problem. One is to point to a 
green competitiveness strategy and the other is to point to the need for international or 
even global agreements. 
If it was possible to convince governments in charge of economic policy and national 
industrial interests that taking the lead in moving on to a green technology would 
actually give an advantage in international competition we might expect governments 
to  introduce  green  policies  in  order  to  enter  a  process  of  ‘green  competition’.  This  has  
taken place at a modest scale when it comes to windmills in Denmark, electrical cars 
in California and wind and solar power in China. There is certainly truth in this 
argument but it meets with resistance for different reasons.  
One reason is that a coherent green strategy will disfavor industries with a long 
historical legacy and with strong political power. Organizations that represent the 
enterprise sector as well as the financial industrial complex will tend to oppose 
government intervention if some of those they represent get worse off. Therefore it 
becomes important for government to establish alliances with those parts of the 
enterprise sector that do have an interest in a green innovation strategy. 
Another factor reducing national efforts in the West is that there is general resistance 
among the establishment, often fed by mainstream macro economists, to selective 
policy   giving   the   state   a   steering   role.   The   assumption   that   ‘the   market’   can   and  
should do the job of allocating resources and that governments should only be 
involved when there are obvious cases of market failure is widely spread. This market 
dogmatism in the West may be contrasted to the extreme degree of pragmatism that 
characterizes the Chinese leaders who have no problems with using any kind of mix 
of market, management and planning as long as it works. One of the interesting 
results from innovation research   is   that   ‘pure  markets’   are  quite   ineffective  when   it  
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comes to promote innovation and that markets where innovations are frequent are 
organized around an interaction between producers and users. A change toward a 
green innovation strategy will require a battle with this kind of market dogmatism. 
But of course there are initiatives that need to be taken that can be difficult to 
implement at the national level without international co-ordination. If industries are 
footloose specific new green burdens may result in outsourcing to other countries and 
in extreme cases the outsourcing may result in a net negative global impact upon the 
environment. This might be the case if activities are moved to a country without any 
green ambitions. So in parallel with national efforts there is a need to design global 
co-operation. 
So far much of the attention in connection with global co-operation has been on 
reaching agreements on targets for reduction of the amount of CO2 produced. We 
think that changing the perspective somewhat and giving more attention to how to 
promote innovation in green technologies might help getting out of the current 
stalemates.  The  establishment  of  problem  based  ‘mega-science’  and  mega-technology 
projects where national scholars and enterprises collaborate and share knowledge 
relevant for solving ecological problems (water, desertification, renewable 
technologies) might be one way to make national agreements in this area more 
realistic. Global engineering universities with a strong profile in terms of 
sustainability technologies could be another type of new institutions that could move 
things in the right direction.  
New Processes (production, transport and logistics) requiring less resource input per 
unit of production. 
One of the reasons why labor productivity has been growing for centuries is that labor 
constantly has become more and more costly. We would argue that a similar effect on 
resource productivity may come from an ongoing increase in green taxes. While a 
steep increase in a tax might have the strongest immediate impact on behavior it will 
need to be combined with a long term incremental increase over time in order to 
shape a new trajectory where the focus and the attention is moved from labor to 
resource productivity.  
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To develop new capital goods for production purposes that are less intensive in the 
use of resources will require a combination of different kinds of innovation efforts. 
Research, development and design efforts among producers of capital equipment need 
to be combined with close interaction with the user industries or with the public sector 
as user. Especially when moving on to a new trajectory the close interaction between 
producers and users will be of crucial importance. To locate and to give special 
attention and support to lead users will be an important part of the strategy. Learning 
to produce and learning to use the new equipment will require major efforts. Existing 
business and work organization principles will need to be assessed and developed to 
support the new technologies.   
Substituting non-renewable with renewable resources. 
This refers both to energy production, the distribution of energy and the use of 
energy. While there has been major technical progress in the production of renewable 
energy some of the most important bottle necks have to do with storage and with 
linking production to the distribution nets. When it comes to use in for instance 
electrical vehicles the bottle-neck is a combination of battery technology and the 
absence of infrastructure. 
Without going into detail there seems to be a rather clear agenda for research, 
development and experimentation. What is needed is a mobilization of resources to 
attack and solve the problems. Again major problem based collaborative projects, 
both national and transnational need to be established in order to open up bottlenecks. 
A specific task for intelligent innovation strategy is to locate strategic missing links. 
There are many cases where there is a great potential in linking knowledge fields to 
each other but where there is no spontaneous mechanism that couples the fields. One 
example could be to link new insights from biotechnology and nanotechnology to the 
research on different forms of renewable energy.     
New consumer products which are more long lasting and more recyclable. 
It is a difficult challenge for public policy to intervene in order to realize this 
objective. Superficial forms of intervention could take aim at the sales efforts that 
stimulate consumers to ask for more and more recent models. Alternative would be to 
establish a collaboration between enterprise sector and regulatory authorities where 
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the producer could become recognized as a green standard producer. For instance a 
green car producer may have to offer both a car that is environmentally friendly, 
recyclable and a 20 year guarantee to the buyer.  
The third possible action would involve consumers in the process. Consumer 
organizations may be given a clearer mandate to rank products according to their 
environmental impact and government may set a threshold for what are acceptable 
minimum standards and actually exclude the non-acceptable ones from the national 
markets. 
Again the innovation process will require both research and development and the 
interaction with users. In some fields users may actually be engaged in the innovation 
process either as user panels or as members of consumer organisations. Upgrading the 
skills and insights of consumers through training and information campaigns when it 
comes to recycling and durability may go hand in hand with negotiations with a d 
certification of producers. 
A change in the sectoral composition of the economy towards less resource intensive 
production activities. 
An interesting question is if a green innovation strategy would slow down change 
including structural change. The answer will be that some forms of innovations need 
to be slowed down – innovations that exploit consumers urge for newness in material 
goods and innovations that lead to growth in resource-intensive production. But at the 
same time there will be a need to speed up innovation and actually we would expect 
the restructuring of the over all economy to be accelerated in the move toward green 
production. 
This has implications for finance of innovation and investment. To channel finance 
into  new  green  industries  there  will  be  a  need  to  establish  ‘green  development  banks’  
where government play an important role as determining the direction of investment. 
Not when it comes to pick specific projects but when it comes to promote specific 
new industries that need to be promoted in order to build a green production and 
innovation system. So the most fundamental mechanism behind economic growth – 
structural change – will be strengthened rather than weakened. 
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This restructuring will of course be reflected in shifts in the demand for labor. There 
will be sectors where specific jobs disappear while new jobs in other sectors are 
created and many existing jobs will require new skill and new perspectives on how to 
do things. Very ambitious combinations of education, life-long learning and labor 
market policies will be required in order to transform green innovations into wide 
production and use. Not least will there be a need for new kinds of education and for 
retraining of engineers, designers, skilled workers and managers. 
A change in the location of economic activities that reduces resource use for transport 
To transport resources from one part of the world to another requires major resources 
and among ecological movements there have been proposals aiming at co-localisation 
of production and consumption. On the other hand the conventional economic 
wisdom   is   that   any   trade   that   actually   takes   place   is   ‘rational’   in   the   sense   that   the  
specialization that it reflects contributes to a more efficient allocation than what there 
would be without trade. 
The actual efficiency of the current pattern of global trade and of the volume of 
transport of people and goods that it results in is difficult to judge because a 
substantial   part   of   the   trade   is   ‘managed’   and   takes place within transnational 
corporations. Taxes on international transport and international trade that correspond 
to the impact upon the environment – so that the activities would reflect the costs 
might be useful to scale down some forms of trade of marginal usefulness. 
There is an ongoing innovation process aiming at more efficient methods of transport 
and again it is an area where a combination of national and global problem based 
projects could result in major breakthroughs. The high degree of concentration in the 
sector might require that third parties – for instance at the UN-level - help the major 
business groups join forces in order to develop more sustainable modes of transport.   
New forms of agglomerations and new principles for housing that reduce resource 
use. 
The construction sector is for different reasons among the most conservative in terms 
of innovation and organizational change. To some degree this reflects a special kind 
of division of labor where those who design projects are separated from those who 
implement them. A specific factor is that architects in charge of the design operate in 
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separation from the engineers that transform the design into practical solutions. 
Another factor that slows down innovation is that the themes that work to construct a 
new building are put together ad hoc so that the cumulative learning is limited from 
one project to the next. 
When it comes to build green buildings some of these weaknesses of the innovation 
process may need to be overcome. Also new combinations of technologies and 
disciplines may help develop new forms of housing that are both comfortable esthetic 
and sustainable. This is an area where government already set standards and 
developing new standards that are more ambitious in collaboration with experts and 
citizens is a natural step. Again the standards should be goal oriented rather than very 
specific prescriptions so that room is left for creativity. 
Towards a greening innovation system. 
In the last sections we discussed how innovation could contribute to a more 
sustainable path of development. If these different initiatives where taken we believe 
that we might end up with a new kind of innovation system. It would be system where 
the different components converged toward new objectives and gradually accepted 
new norms for what is acceptable in term of environmental conditions. The attention 
would be much more turned to how innovations impact the environment. The 
performance indicators used to measure progress would be different and consumers 
would have found new ways to satisfy their need for stimulation and newness. 
We see no technical barriers for moving the innovation system in this direction. 
However, as pointed out already in the introduction the political and institutional 
barriers are huge. Vested interests, nationalism, finance capital, economic marketer 
dogma and political short termism constitute huge barriers for the change that is 
needed. We can only hope that a new way of tackling the ecological crisis will 
develop as problems become more serious. This new perspective must combine 
participation and democratic procedures with a long term engineering view where 
problems are recognized as they are and where all kinds of solutions are considered 
without ideological prejudice.     
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Conclusions 
It is an open question if the capitalist process of production and accumulation can 
become   environmentally   sustainable.   It   is   of   course   important   not   to   “confuse   the  
limits of one particular development paradigm, with the limits to growth of the system 
in  general”  (Freeman  1992).  It  is  clear,  however,  that  the  scale  of  the  problem  requires  
radical changes not only in technologies but also in values, institutions, policies and 
consumption patterns to develop what Christopher Freeman (1992) two decades ago 
termed  a  “green  techno-economic  paradigm”.   
On   the   background   of   the   discussion   above   we   can   reformulate   the   ‘factor   X’  
question:  “How many times is it possible for the amount of wealth extracted from one 
unit of natural resources to increase within a certain time span as a result of 
technological improvement in combination with changes of values, institutions, 
policies, and patterns of consumption and is this sufficient to decouple economic 
growth from destruction of our common environment?” 
If we restrict the analysis to a situation where the current architecture of capitalism is 
left unchanged there is little ground for optimism. It is difficult to see how necessary 
changes can be installed under current governance where financial capital rules real, 
intellectual and natural capital. And envisaging the alternatives to the current system 
is not an easy task.  So our optimism is very relative and conditional indeed. But the 
alternative, to accept that we have to look ahead without hope, is worse.  
Inspired by the suggestive title of Christopher Freeman’s book (1992) “The 
Economics of Hope”,  we take a conditionally optimistic stance to the question. 
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